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Will small farm viability decline with the reduction of average farm size in Pakistan? 
This paper addresses the determinants of rural household and farm-related income. Using the 
2001 PIDE Household Survey, the approach developed captures the potential interactions 
between farm returns and household, farm, and factor market characteristics (schooling, family 
size, land tenure and operational size, access to water, credit, and capital). Econometric results 
show: (a) returns to additional schooling and the revenue elasticity of operated acres increase 
with farm size; (b) medium and large farm renters would be willing to pay more than observed 
rents, implying an incentive to increase farm size at the prevailing rental values; (c) owner-
operated farms, landowners who also leases in, and fixed rental tenants earn higher revenues 
than sharecropping tenants. The difference, however, between landowner/fix-renter income 
and sharecropper income varies with family and farm size, as well as water use. While these 
results favour farm size increase, the results also show that off-farm and non-farm income 
sources are relatively more important for small farmers, contributing to their viability. 
JEL classification:  D13, Q12, Q15 
Keywords:  Pakistan, Land Markets, Rural Factor Markets, Revenue Function 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Agriculture is an important sector in Pakistan’s economy, accounting for a 
quarter of GDP and roughly two-thirds of exports value. Farming and its linked activities 
are the main economic activities in rural areas, where about two-thirds of Pakistanis live. 
During the previous decade, the sector grew at a healthy 4.5 percent per year, a rate 
higher than in other South Asian countries. Nevertheless, this expansion in agricultural 
GDP apparently did not reduce the poverty rate, which stalled at around 36 percent 
during the 1990s.  Why did agricultural growth not lead to rural poverty reduction?
1 
This paper presents a quantitative analysis of the determinants of farm 
household income (and therefore poverty), emphasising the interactions between 
factor markets. The analysis takes a statistical approach that accounts for the various 
sources of farm income: farm production, off-farm employment, transfers and 
remittances, and returns to assets. It captures the interactions between farm size and 
other variables, such as labour education, land fragmentation, work outside the 
household, capital assets, water, and geographic location. The main results are in 
terms of the effects on farm-related revenues of changes in household characteristics 
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(education and family size) and quasi-fixed factors of production (land owned, land 
operated, water, credit, and capital). The interpretation of the results are in terms of 
elasticities (the percentage changes in farm revenue that results from an increase of 
some percentage in a variable of interest) and focuses on three farm sizes (up to four 
acres, between 4 and 20 acres, and greater than 20). 
The analysis employs the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS), completed in 
2001, which includes data on farm output and variable input quantities, product and 
factor prices, household characteristics, and quasi-fixed factors in the short-term (land, 
fixed capital, education, canal water, family labour and credit).  
 
2.  SOURCES OF INCOME OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
The PRHS allows a depiction of rural households according to farm land 
ownership, farm sizes, principal income sources and other characteristics. Table 1 
summarises the main income sources of Pakistani rural households separated by size of 
farm operation in acres. The first three rows of Table 1 show income from farming; the 
fifth row, income from land leasing; rows six through eight, wage and non-farm 
enterprise  income;  and  rows  ten  and  eleven, pensions  and transfers.  Excluding  the 
 
Table 1 












(4 - 20) 
Large 
(>20) 
Income from Field Crops  21,607  278  7,111  31,420  93,562 
Income from Other Crops  44,626  196  26,821 61,686  145,197 
Income from Livestock  17,688 14,586  13,907 20,811  29,303 
Total Income from Farm Operation  83,921 15,060  47,839 113,917  268,062 
Land Leasing  5,098  10,827  2,889  2,439  17,552 
Off-farm Agricultural Income (Ag. Wages) 2,318  1,565  2,669  2,590  707 
Income from Non-farm Enterprise 5,384  2,158  5,412  5,079  12,678 
Non-farm Agricultural Wages  8,673  6,285  9,365 8,661 9,641 
Wage and Enterprise Income  16,375 10,008  17,446 16,330  23,026 
Pensions 1,261  1,306  302  1,637  4,488 
Private  Transfers  3,439  2,650  3,448 2,410 9,452 
Public Transfers  2,537  1,954  1,435  274  19,397 
Pensions and Transfers  7,237 5,910  5,185  4,321  33,337 
Total Income  112,631  41,805  73,359 137,007 341,977 
Source as Proportion of Total Income 
Total Income from Farm Operation 0.75  0.36  0.65  0.83  0.78 
Land Leasing  0.05  0.26  0.04  0.02  0.05 
Off-farm Wage and Enterprise Income 0.15 0.24  0.24  0.12  0.07 
Pensions and Transfers 0.06  0.14  0.07  0.03  0.10 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PIDE (2001). Note that averages are calculated excluding non-farm 
households. Note that farm revenues are net of variable purchased input, but not of land rental or 
sharecropping payments. Rental payments per acre decline with farm size. Determinants of Farm Revenue 
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category “landless”, income from farm operations is the main source of total income: 65 
percent for small farms, to 83 percent for medium, and 78 percent for large. Land leasing 
income is a relatively small proportion, between 2 percent and 5 percent, except for 
“landless”, a category which includes households that lease-out all of their agricultural 
land. Off-farm wage and non-farm enterprise sources are relatively more important for 
small farmers (24 percent of total income for small farmers, 12 percent for medium and 7 
percent for large). Notably, pensions and transfers for large farmers averages 10 percent 
of total income compared to 7 percent for small farmers. For households without operated 
agricultural land, non-farm sources of income are relatively more important. Notably, 
land leasing accounts for a quarter of their total income.  
 
Farm Household Characteristics 
Table 2 summarises the PRHS data for average household characteristics 
according to operated farm size, dividing farms into four separate categories: households 
without operated agricultural land (but with livestock or land leasing as main income 
source), small farms (up to 4 acres), medium farms (between 4 and 20 acres), and large 
farms (more than 20 acres). On average, households are large with almost 9 members per 
unit; and, in contrast to farm households in middle-income economies, wealthier 
Pakistani  farm  households are larger than poorer farm households.  The average level of  
 
Table 2 
















Capital (Rp. 100’s)  319  94  114  458  1,195 
Capital (Rp. 100’s/Acre)  32  N/A  54  50  17 
Education  (Years)  6.12  6.30 5.91 6.11 6.94 
Household Size  9.08  8.22  8.51  9.52  11.67 
Agricultural Investment from Formal 
Sources (Rp.)  10,373 4,636  4,298  14,914  32,584 
Agricultural Investment from Formal 
Sources (Rp./Acre)  1,054  N/A  2,045  1,621  456 
Investing Households %  13  7  9  17  25 
Agricultural Investment from Informal 
Sources (Rp.)  3,392  209  1,046  7,427  3,674 
Agricultural Investment from Informal 
Sources (Rp./Acre)  345 N/A  498  807  51 
Investing Households %  8  2  8  11  6 
Operational Farm Size (Acres)  10  0  2  9  71 
Proportion of Net Revenues from (%):           
Livestock  21  97 29 18 11 
Main Field Crops  26  2  15  28  35 
Other Crops  53  1  56  54  54 
Proportion of Sample %  100  15  41  35  8 
Source: Authors’ Calculations based on PIDE (2001). Anríquez and Valdés 
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formal education of the household head is about 6 years, and education levels increase by 
farm size
2. Total non-land capital stock value is positively correlated with farm size, large 
farms having on average a capital stock valued 10 times greater than that of small farms. 
Medium farms, however, have larger capital stocks per unit of land.  
Formal credit, usually tied to available collateral (mainly land), is positively 
correlated with agricultural operation size, but again medium-size farms realise larger 
agricultural investments. Informal credit is also positively correlated with land. Although 
formal credit is the main source of financing for farms of all sizes, informal sources are 
relatively more important for small and medium farms than for large farms.  For large 
farms, informal sources represent about 10 percent of the value of funding from formal 
sources. 
 
3.  REVENUE FUNCTIONS FOR PAKISTANI FARM HOUSEHOLDS 
The emphasis of this analysis is on the ability of households to generate net 
income from livestock and farming activities; that is, the focus is on the net returns to 
household farm-related assets, which include human and physical capital associated 
with the farm operations. Household income is defined here as farm-related income 
and excludes labour income from off-farm employment as well as pensions and 
transfers. For landowners, returns are generated from their own cultivation of their 
land, and from income derived from leasing-out land. For tenant households (both 
cash leasing and sharecropping), income is generated by their share in the farm 
operation, which yields returns to their on-farm labour and capital (off-farm income 
and remittances are excluded).  For “landless” farm-operating households, income 
corresponds both to that generated from their own cattle and poultry production on 
common-property and owned non-cultivated land, and to that generated by leasing 
out all of their agricultural land. 
Net farm-related household income is defined as gross farm revenues less the cost 
of purchased (i.e., variable) inputs. To analyse the determinants of net household income, 
we make use of the restricted revenue function.
3  
Algebraically, gross revenue from agricultural production activity can be 
represented in terms of two types of inputs: short-term fixed inputs, z, and variable 
inputs, x : 
)} , ( { max ) , ; ( z x f q pq z x p R
q
≤ =   … … … … …  (1) 
The restricted (net) revenue function is defined as gross revenues less the cost of 
purchased (variable) inputs, x: 
} ) , ; ( { max ) , ; (
~
wx z x p R z x p R
x
− =   … … … … …  (2) 
Assuming that the household selects the level of variable inputs to maximise short-
term net revenue, one can estimate the relationship between observed net revenues and 
 
2This positive correlation between land size and head education is partly due to the way we imputed 
education for some heads. Please see Data Details section below. 
3Diewert (1973) presents a formal treatment of the now frequently used revenue function approach.  Determinants of Farm Revenue 
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levels of prices and fixed inputs.
4 The restricted revenue function,  ), ; , (
~
z w p R is positively 
homogenous of degree 1 in output and variable input prices, continuous, increasing and 
convex in prices, and is continuous, increasing and concave in fixed inputs z. 
In this analysis of the case of Pakistan, net revenues derive from many crops, and we 
assume that farmers choose an optimal combination of outputs. Crops include field crops 
(cotton, sugar, wheat and rice), other crops (including other cash crops, fruits), and livestock 
(which includes poultry and dairy revenues). Quasi-fixed inputs consist of land, canal water, 
non-land capital, education, own labour, and agricultural credit. To calculate net revenues, we 
subtract from gross revenues the variable input costs associated with hired labour, seeds, 
fertilisers (organic and chemical), pesticides, purchased tube-well water, and machinery and 
equipment rental; and add/subtract the revenue/cost of land leasing arrangements. 
It is important to note that for Pakistan canal water can be considered a quasi-fixed 
input, because canal water is tied to land holdings and the market for water is limited. 
Normally, farms are endowed with one canal turn per week per acre of land in a 
rotational system, called warabandi, with turns usually lasting 20 minutes. These water 
endowments depend on land holdings, not crop area, and are independent of any other 
demand consideration, such as the type of crop under cultivation, terrain seepage, or 
seasonality. Farmers make some adjustments by trading their canal turns to adjust for 
peak crop demand, but these trades usually occur between neighbouring plots. Sales of 
canal turns are uncommon, and in any case not necessarily legal, a fact which may lead to 
some underreporting.  Table 3  reports  canal  water  usage  and market transactions in the  
 
Table 3  
Canal Water Usage and Transactions by District Average Hours by Farm 
   Given  or  Sold  or 
Surveyed 
Farms with 
District Endowed  Received Purchased  Canal  Water 
Faisalabad 525  6.30  1.99  56 
Attock  0 0 0 0 
Hafizabad  24 0.11  0.03 21 
Vehari  37 0.03  1.75 52 
Muzafar  Garh  16 0.04  0.02 21 
Bahawalpur  16 1.10  0.04 54 
Badin 382  19.31  9.45  80 
N. Shah  65  1.78  25.56  44 
M.  P.  Khas  73 0.00  4.57 46 
Larkana 143  8.00 0  6 
Dir  0 0 0 0 
Mardan 391  2.00  0.00  36 
Total 204  5.19  5.52  416 
Source: PIDE (2001). 
 
4An interesting property of the restricted revenue function (2) is that, assuming variable inputs levels 
are optimally selected, revenues net of variable input costs can be written without explicit reference to the 
variable input. Partially differentiating with respect to x one obtains:  . 0 / ) , ; ( / ) ; ; (
~
= − ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ w x z x p R x z x p R  If 
the marginal returns of the variable input, ∂R(p;x,z)/ ∂x, are not equal its opportunity cost, w,  then the farmer 
will employ more or less of it, until its marginal returns equal its marginal cost.  Anríquez and Valdés 
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different districts of rural Pakistan. Except for the districts of Badin, N. Shah, and M.P. 
Khas, there are very few market transactions of canal water.  
Given the importance of land transactions (sharecropping and fixed rental 
agreements), we treat land as a special input. Once the farm is in operation, 
cultivated land is a fixed input in the short-term, i.e. during the growing season. 
Farmers can adjust their land holdings (leasing in or out) in the medium term, but for 
a given season, the land available is a quasi-fixed input, unlike for example, the use 
of fertiliser, which can be optimally adjusted in the short run. The land operated 
includes owned land, as well as land operated through a fixed rental or sharecropping 
agreement.
5  As done with the variable inputs, we subtract the cost of use of land, but 
instead of assuming optimal usage (as we do with variable inputs) we test for optimal 
behaviour with land holdings. For fixed rental arrangements, the rental cost of not-
owned, operated land is subtracted from household revenues. For tenant 
sharecroppers rental costs we subtract their agreed upon share of the value of output. 
The returns to household assets include revenues generated by the household’s use of 
land, irrespective of the land’s ownership. The returns to land specifically are 
distributed between the owner and the operator, who could be the same agent. 
Revenues and input costs and usage are calculated at the operated farm level. For 
landlords with tenants, operated land excludes that which is leased-out, but we 
include the revenues from those lease agreements (fixed rent received in cash or in 
kind), and the corresponding net value of output from their sharecropping contracts.  
Agricultural land distribution is notably unequal in rural Pakistan. In the case of 
east and south Asia generally, the average Gini for operational holdings of agricultural 
land ranges between 0.52 and 0.56, and Pakistan specifically has Gini coefficients similar 
to the world’s highest rates, which are found in Latin America. Table 4 shows the 
disparity between the mean and the median of farm sizes (owned and operational), 
reflecting the skewness of land distribution. In the case of owned land, for example, the 
mean is 10.17 acres in contrast to the median of 3 acres, and not surprisingly the Gini 
coefficient is high (0.82). Table 4 also shows that in terms of the operational size of farms 
land leasing offsets the inequality in land ownership, lowering the relative disparity 
between the mean and the median farm sizes, the coefficient of variability, and the Gini 
index for operational holding size. 
 
Table 4 
The Distribution of Farm Size and Land Ownership (Acres) 




Land Ownership  10.17  3  4.62  0.824 
Leased (Out) Land  1.93  3.71  4.40  0.894 
Operational Farm  9.85  3.75  4.19  0.733 
Source: PIDE (2001). 
 
5The degree of involvement of the landlord in a sharecropping operation varies from that of an absentee 
owner to that of a manager making all farming decisions (the sharecropper being almost like a wage labourer 
paid in kind). Determinants of Farm Revenue 
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Other important determinants of household revenue that can be treated as fixed 
inputs in the short term include household head education, the household size (an 
indicator of own family labour supply) and the capital stock. Agricultural credit (formal 
and informal) may be thought of as a quasi-fixed input, fixed within a given year, 
although adjustable over a longer term. Treating credit as a separate fixed input serves to 
measure the marginal effect on profitability of the distribution of financial funds across 
farms
6.  
The restricted revenue function we estimate below may be described by: 
R(p; A, X, E, K, W, E, L) =  R (p; A, X, E, K, W, D;  purchased inputs) – 
                                           C (purchased inputs) + r(L – A) … …  (3) 
where  R (·) represents gross revenues from the farming operation-income from farming 
directly. A is land utilised in the farm operation, r is the rental rate per acre, L is total land 
owned, and r(L – A) is earnings from leasing out or costs from leasing in land used in the 
farm operation. C(·) represents the costs of all purchased variable inputs. The quasi-fixed 
inputs that determine farm value are: X, which is family labour; E is education, K capital, 
W is water, and D is credit. Costs of purchased inputs and productivity could vary by 
district, and dummy variables (i.e. fixed effects) are included in the estimation to account 
for such differences.  
The reader should note what income sources are excluded in this measure of 
income from farming: off-farm wage and non-farm enterprise income and income from 
pensions, government transfers and remittances. These exclusions influence the 
interpretation of the results, specifically the effects on farm income due to changes in 
household labour (reported here in terms of elasticities). The estimated marginal effect of 
household labour, X, on farm income should reflect, in equilibrium, the opportunity costs 
of working off the farm, which includes income money earnings net of transactions costs 
(likely non-trivial).  
The estimated form of the net revenue function (3), should not be a function of 
operated land A if the land market was perfectly working.  The estimated coefficients for 
operated land, A, should lead to the value of the marginal product equaling the rental rate, 











. If there are no constraints on land trades, the gross 
revenue of an additional acre of land should equal its rental rate.  In the case of land 







. Thus, if there are no non-market benefits or costs associated with land 
ownership, and if there are no constraints to land trades, the elasticity should be equal to 









 positive but less than 1 
 
6The use of credit as a quasi-fixed factor of production is problematic, because it may be argued that it 
is a variable input.  We deal with this issue statistically performing an exogeneity test on this variable. To do so 
we sorted observations using the de Luna and Johansson (2000) sorting score, and then performed a Nyblom 
(1989), Hansen (1992) stability test, to check for exogeneity of that particular regressor. The null hypothesis of 
exogeneity was not rejected.  For further details, please request a longer version of this paper, available from the 
authors. Anríquez and Valdés 
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(roughly 0.05 according to the values presented in Table 1).  There is, however, a 
possibility of a negative elasticity with respect to land owned (L) if the owner perceives 
other (non-market) benefits to owning more land beyond the rental value, and/or there are 
constraints on renting out land. Such additional benefits might arise from expected land 
appreciation, land being a means of wealth accumulation (savings), easier credit terms, 
and non-pecuniary returns like social status. Additionally, a landowner may choose not to 
rent out land at the market rental rate if he perceives the risk of expropriation of land, or 
if there are significant search costs of finding trustworthy renters. 
 
4.  DATA  DETAILS 
Prices where first calculated on a per good/unit basis using the declared value of 
output, and where then aggregated weighing by revenue shares. For households with no 
available price information, i.e. those that did not produce any of the goods in any of the 
three aggregates, we used district level means.  
Capital, measured in 100’s Rp., was constructed with the declared value of 
machinery and equipment owned by the household. For shared property capital we used 
only the household’s corresponding share. Capital goods include: tractors, tube-wells, lift 
pumps, machine pulled plows, animal pulled plows, mechanical water pumps, combine 
harvesters, motorised threshers, rice planters, manual corn shellers, mechanical corn 
shellers, chakki, fodder choppers, motorised biocide pumps, hand biocide pumps, tractor 
trolleys, bullock carts, generator engine, and other. 
With respect to the education of the household head we had to make an special 
treatment given the high degree of non-response to this question. For the missing 
observations we used the previously found correlation between land holdings and 
education of the head of household and estimated the following equation:
7 
ln(Education)=1.86 (Punjab Dummy) + 1.51 (Sindh Dummy) + 1.75 (NWFP Dummy) 
 (0.63)  (0.059) (0.070) 
 
  1.83 (Balochistan Dummy) + 0.051 ln(Land Operated)  …  (4) 
 (0.143)  (0.023) 
     R
2 = 0.90;  Std. errors in paranthesis.   
Thus for the missing education values we used the predicted values from the above 
equation.  
  As explained above, we specifically differentiate between land owned and land 
operated. Land operated is defined as agricultural land (in acres) operated by the 
household; and it is calculated from the identity: 
Land Operated  =  Land Owned + Land Leased-In – Land Leased-Out  …  (5) 
Land owned (in acres), on the other hand, corresponds to the agricultural land the 
household declares to own.  
 
7The correlation between land holdings and education of the head has been consistently found in rural 
studies around the world. López and Valdés  (2000), for example, offer several cases of this correlation from 




Regression Variables Summary Statistics, by Farm Category 
(Means and Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 











67.267  141.002 358.382 727.903 339.181  Revenues 
(Normalised) (83.60)  (433.02)  (767.94)  (1,427)  (1,427) 
2.441 1.983 2.986 2.573 2.564 
p1 
(0.454)  (1.271) (17.279) (2.334) (11.435) 
9.987  8.008  26.392 13.075 17.069 
p2 
(19.417)  (21.031) (339.974) (29.313) (224.403) 
7.295 8.435 9.114  10.780  9.078  Household     














6.155 5.911 6.009 6.749 6.130  Education of 
the  Head (2.164) (2.552) (2.144) (2.517) (2.363) 
0.000 0.981 4.732  41.815  10.174  Land Owned 
(Acres)    (0.000) (0.873) (3.293)  (93.079)  (43.073) 
0.000 1.423 5.674  37.224  9.855  Land 
Operated    (0.000)  (1.123)  (3.453)  (90.315)  (41.282) 
0.662  33.954  47.967 150.435 59.208  Canal Turns 
(3.851)  (188.952) (241.065) (753.714) (379.343) 
Informal 
Credit 











Observations  88  336 483 209  1116 
Note:  Authors’ calculations from PIDE 2001 data. Note, this table is not exactly comparable to Table 2, 
because this table includes only observations included in the regressions.  
 
Water corresponds to canal water usage. It was calculated in terms of canal water 
turns (hours). The variable measures total canal water used (total hours) per plot per 
agricultural season (rabi and kharif). 
Credit, measured in 100’s Rp. corresponds to the value of loans from informal 
sources (family, friends, village lender) used for purposes of the agricultural operation. 
Net Revenues (Rp.) is the declared value of all the rents from the agricultural 
operation after discounting the cost of use of variable inputs and land. Thus, net revenues 
may be expressed as: 
Net Revenues = Gross Revenues from Agricultural Output – Cost of Usage of 
Variable Inputs + Rents from Land Lease-Out Arrangements – Cost of Land 
Lease-In  Arrangements  … … … … … …  (6) Anríquez and Valdés 
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The costs of variable inputs discounted are: hired labour, seeds, fertilisers (organic 
and chemical), pesticides, purchased tube-well water, and machinery and equipment rental. 
 
5.  ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
To estimate the restricted revenue function, we choose a generalised quadratic 
specification. This flexible functional form does not impose any restriction on the 
underlying technology in terms of elasticities of substitution, and, in principle, all 
theoretical properties can be tested.
8  The revenue maximisation assumption does not 
impose restrictions on the underlying technologies; it implicitly assumes that the 
production possibilities are available to all farmers, and that they rationally adjust the 
output mix to maximise revenues, and hence returns to assets. The underlying restricted 
revenue function can be approximated linearly: 
∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
== == ==
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where indexes i and j refer to output prices p≡{1. field crops, 2. livestock, and 3. other 
crops} and indexes k,  l refer to quasi fixed inputs Z≡{1. Capital, 2. Education, 3. 
Household Size, 4. Land, 5. Water, and 6. Credit}. To reduce the number of estimated 
parameters, we use the property of linear homogeneity in prices of the function and 
divide by the price of other crops: 
∑∑ ∑∑
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where p1 is the price of other crops, and  1
~ p  and  2
~ p are price of field crops divided by 
price of other crops and price of livestock divided by price of other crops, respectively.
9 
District dummies capture region-specific differences between farms, such as land 
fertility, climate and other unobservable farm characteristics correlated with the district in 
which the household lives. Additionally, we include type-of-tenancy dummies (i.e. owner 
operated, sharecropping tenant operated, etc.) to test for tenancy specific differences in 
revenues. The results of the estimated regression are presented in Table 6, and the 
implicit elasticities from this regression are presented in Table 7. 
As an example of the process of calculating elasticities, consider the elasticity of 
the revenue function with respect to education:  
) ( ˆ




























k k  … …  (9) 
 
8For more details on flexible functional forms see Diewert and Wales (1987), for more details on the 
theoretical properties of the revenue function see Chambers (1988). This functional form also has the advantage 
that it does not make logarithmic transformations that cannot be applied to variables with zeros like in our data set.  
9We assume that price variability is the result of exogenous conditions (such as distance to markets) 




Net Farm Revenue Regressions 
Faisalabad District Dummy  911.953  296.536*** 
Attock District Dummy  127.294  274.423 
Hafizabad District Dummy  479.423  267.350* 
Vehari District Dummy 399.374  247.395 
Muzafar Garh District Dummy  106.752  254.797 
Bahawalpur District Dummy  89.888  243.989 
Badin District Dummy  92.993  259.873 
N. Shah District Dummy  –6.581  247.579 
M. P. Khas District Dummy  189.806  242.024 
Larkana District Dummy  104.409  251.371 
Dir District Dummy  –12.319  253.987 
Mardan District Dummy  –91.265  254.289 
L. Marwat District Dummy  –6.192  261.175 
Loralai District Dummy  –208.439  304.532 
Khuzdar District Dummy  52.925  262.278 
Gawadar District Dummy  –259.975  295.381 
Owner Operated Farm  161.021  49.169*** 
Owner Operated Farm and Landowner  180.960  67.586*** 
Owner Operated and Tenant  65.525  66.985 
Sharecropping Tenant  299.608  123.349** 
Tenant with Fixed Rent Agreement  162.377  156.617 
Female Headed Household  72.458  100.993 
p1 –112.567  93.415 
p1 x p1  9.610  3.264*** 
p1 x p2  –0.058  0.368 
p1 x Capital Stock  0.111  0.052** 
p1 x Education  24.721  11.991** 
p1 x Household Size  0.994  5.315 
p1 x Water  0.136  0.183 
p1 x Credit  –0.635  0.426 
p1 x Operated Land  1.832  1.929 
p2 4.910  4.929 
p2 x p2  –0.023  0.018 
p2 x Capital Stock  –0.001  0.002 
p2 x Education  0.937  0.519* 
p2 x Household Size  –0.522  0.418 




p2 x Water  1.867E-04  8.636E-03 
p2 x Credit  0.023  0.018 
p2 x Operated Land  0.215  0.113* 
Capital Stock  –0.077  0.118 
Household Size  17.743  19.806 
Education –84.131  35.211** 
Land Owned  –6.980  4.664 
Land Operated  0.719  7.936 
Land Operated x Land Operated  0.003  0.039 
Education x Education  0.065  0.798 
Water –0.625  0.638 
Household Size x Household Size  –0.713  0.482 
Land Owned x Land Owned  –0.006  0.040 
Capital Stock x Capital Stock  –2.140E-05  1.110E-05* 
Water x Water  –5.660E-05  3.130E-05* 
Water x Capital Stock  –1.392E-04  1.170E-04 
Water x Education  0.110  0.082 
Water x Household Size  0.009  0.030 
Education x Capital Stock  0.044  0.017*** 
Education x Household Size  3.098  1.955 
Capital x Household Size  –0.019  0.006*** 
Credit 0.074  0.608 
Credit x Credit  2.500E-05  7.520E-05 
Credit x Capital Stock  3.160E-04  4.013E-04 
Credit x Education  –0.014  0.144 
Credit x Household Size  0.025  0.074 
Credit x Water  –2.490E-05  2.896E-04 
Land Operated x Capital Stock  3.593E-04  1.520E-03 
Land Operated x Education  0.126  0.260 
Land Operated x Household Size  0.229  0.373 
Land Operated x Water  1.834E-04  1.098E-02 
Land Operated x Credit  0.078  0.053 
Sharecropping x Household Size  –27.769  19.418 
Sharecropping x Land Operated  –31.732  20.134 




Std. error reported are White’s heteroscedasticity consistent.  
























































































Note:  Standard errors in parenthesis. * Implies significant at the 10 percent level,  ** implies significant at the 
5 percent level, and *** implies significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
where the bar over the variable indicates sample means, and the  ij γ ˆ  and  ij δ ˆ are the 
regression estimated coefficients of Equation (8). If instead of sample means we use 
means by farm size, we can approximate the elasticities for the different farm groups.
10 
 
6.  MAIN FINDINGS 
The detailed results of estimating Equation (8) are presented in Table 6. In general, 
the results are satisfactory, with a reasonable fit considering the purely cross-sectional 
nature of the data (R
2 = 65 percent); and all the first order and second order theoretical 
curvature properties of a revenue function are met.  Although, due to multicollinearity 
few individual coefficients are significant, the elasticities of the revenue function with 
respect to the quasi-fixed inputs are in general significant as reported in Table 7. Below 
the results are discussed in terms of individual factors of production.  
 
10Furthermore, to test if the elasticity is significantly different from zero, we divide the elasticity by its 
standard error, which can be obtained by applying the variance operator to the random variable defined in (9), 
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Using the entire sample, we find that the input with the highest elasticity is 
human capital (education), with a value of 0.8.
11  This estimate implies that if the 
education level of the household head were to rise by 10 percent then overall net 
revenues would rise by about 8 percent. Using the average education level of 6.16 
years (from Table 5), another year of education would represent an increase of 
approximately 16 percent in the education level, which would translate into a 13 
percent increase in net revenues: 
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In terms of present value, using a 10 percent discount rate (ρ), the benefit of an additional 
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More realistically, for younger generations, for which the opportunity cost of one more 
year of schooling is the foregone returns associated with family labour, this elasticity 
suggests notably high potential rates of returns in farming, perhaps even higher if they 
migrate to off-farm employment.  
But it is notable that the elasticity with respect to education is much smaller 
for small farms (0.2), and greatest for medium sized farms (1.1). This suggests an 
important and positive interaction between human capital and operational scale. 
Constraints to enlarging farm size would be a bottleneck to improving farm-
generated incomes via improvements in educational levels, which in turn would tend 
to reduce the demand by small farm households for education of their children. A 
factor that might counteract the negative effect of scale is the opportunity to obtain 
returns to better education levels in the generation of income from non-farm 
enterprises. Supporting this possibility is the much higher elasticity (0.9 in Table 7) 
of revenue with respect to education that is estimated for households with no 
operational land.  
 
Farm Operation Size 
The elasticity of operated farm size is increasing with farm size. Because net 
revenues account for the cost of the use of land (and hence the expected elasticity with 
respect to land in an efficiently working land market should be zero) the results suggest a 
greater deviation from the efficient allocation of land in the case of larger farms. The 
 
11Hampering the precision of the estimates of returns to education, and for that matter the reliability of 
the education figures in Table 1, is the unsatisfactory level of response to the question of education of the 
household head in the survey, and the use of imputed values as explained above.  Determinants of Farm Revenue 
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elasticity of revenues with respect to operational size for small farm is 0.05, while 
medium farms have an elasticity of 0.37 and large farms of 1.13. In a well-functioning 
market,  a priori one would expect that increasing the farmer’s and sharecropper’s 
operational land by one acre (by leasing in) would increase income by its marginal value 
product and decrease income by its rental rate. It would not affect income directly 
attributable to farming—because the marginal product of land should equal the rental 
rate. Therefore, the measured elasticity should be zero, and that is what the elasticity 
estimate suggests for small farmers. This is gratifying result, implying that, on average, 
small farmers are rationally allocating land, given the levels of other variable and quasi-
fixed inputs.  
By contrast, the positive and higher elasticities for medium and larger farms 
suggest that for those farms the marginal benefits from scale expansion are higher than 
the observed marginal cost (the rental rate), and those farms should expand. Although we 
expect the net revenue elasticity with respect to operated land to be zero in a well-
functioning land market, this does not imply that rental rates should be the same across 
farm sizes. Hypothetically, if small farmers were side by side with larger farmers, the 
higher elasticity of returns for larger farmers would provide an incentive for large farms 
to expand, bidding up rental rates and inducing a transfer of land from the small to the 
larger operations. 
In areas where small and larger farmers are not side by side, the differences in 
elasticities by farm size could also be due to differences in output mix (and different 
marginal revenue curves with respect to land).  If small farmers are concentrated in 
areas where their smaller size is more appropriate for the more profitable product mix 
(for example horticulture, being produced closer to towns), land transfers would be 
between small farmers and not between small and larger operations outside those areas. 
Land markets might be better developed in those areas where small farmers 
concentrate. The concentration of small farms in areas producing high-valued (per-
acre) products would explain the differences in rental rates, but not the positive 
elasticities for larger farmers. In fact, average observed land rental rates per acre for 
small farms (15,400 rupees) are 2.2 times larger than rental rates for medium farms 
(4,800 rupees). Why might this be so?  
Consistent both with large rental rate difference and with non-zero revenue-
land elasticities is the hypothesis that land owners set rental rates for larger 
operations below those for smaller farmers, and below the larger renter’s short-run 
marginal product. This would require a rationing of total land rented out at that lower 
rate. Land owners might ration land in this way in a similar manner as employers 
offer so-called efficiency wages, extracting renter loyalty and more efficient land and 
water use, and reducing supervision costs. Efficiency rental rates would also tend to 
induce a larger pool of potential renters from which to select, including tenants with 
more working capital. 
In summary, there are two hypothesis (not necessarily exclusive) for these results 
regarding operation size: the first is that small farmers are geographically concentrated in 
areas with higher-valued products and well-functioning land markets; and the second is 




The marginal effect of owned land on household net revenues deriving from farm 
production and land rental (positive for land owners, negative for renters) appears to be 
negative although not statistically significant. This result, which might appear surprising at 
first given that the marginal value product of owned land ought to equal the rental rate, 
suggests that owning land (in contrast to the land input in farm production) has a value that is 
not fully accounted by the agricultural or rental income it generates. That is if land has a value 
beyond its employment as crop production input (say as an instrument for access to credit and 
markets, as a store of wealth, as a speculative investment, and as a source of social power), 
then agricultural revenues would not fully account the returns to land. Landowners would 
perceive a marginal utility associated with an additional owned acre that is greater than the 
marginal revenues it generates in cultivation or in the rental market. 
But the possibility of renting out land should, in a perfectly working market, offer 
constant returns to scale in terms of net revenue generation. Logically, therefore, some 
constraints on land rental (in terms of the optimisation of the farm revenues we are 
measuring) must exist for the farmer simply not to rent out an additional acre at the rental 
rate. As in the case of the results for operational size above, these results for scale of 
ownership suggest some imperfections in the land rental market. The owner might not 
rent out due to a perceived risk of expropriation of land, and/or to the search costs of 
finding trustworthy renters. For medium and large farms, the estimates suggest that 
tenants would be willing to pay more than the observed rental rate, while land owners 
would be willing to accept less. Other benefits and costs are involved in the land market 




Both using all observations, and in the case of the specific estimates for medium 
and large farms, the effect on household revenue of family size is not statistically 
different from zero. To the extent that family size is a proxy for family labour employed 
in the farm operation, this result suggests that own labour is employed up to the point 
where marginal gross revenue is zero. But the reader should note that the absence of data 
on the quantities of family labour effectively employed in the farm operation is a major 
weakness. If family size is a good proxy for family labour employed in production, then 
the result suggests a near-zero opportunity cost of family labour in medium and large 
farms; but a much higher and significant opportunity cost in the case of small farms. 
More likely, however, for medium and large farms, family size is weakly correlated with 
family labour actually employed in farm production; while for smaller farms, family size 
is a better indicator of actual household agricultural labour.
13  An increase in the number 
 
12Note that neither the elasticity of revenues with respect to owned land nor the elasticity with respect to 
operational land are measuring the marginal products of land in cultivation, as would be obtained from a production 
function. Using net revenues at the level of individual plot, another study by the World Bank (2002) based on a 
preliminary version of the same data set, found decreasing returns of land with respect to farm operational size. 
13Furthermore, in the case of this Pakistani sample, family size is positively correlated with wealth and 
wealth with farm size. The dependency ratio (family dependents relative to family workers) will likely increase 
with family size. To the extent that family size is positively correlated with both children and aged grandparents 
(and other relatives), there would be a lower correlation between family size and the family labour effectively 
employed on the farm.  Determinants of Farm Revenue 
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of family members for larger farms is perhaps directed to leisure or to non-farm-
production work (activities with benefits not accounted in the net revenue measure used).  
By contrast, in the case of small farms and landless households, the estimates of 
the household income elasticity with respect to family size (labour) are positive and 
significant. The effect of family labour is particularly high for the landless group. It is 
highly likely that such families have less opportunity of employing non-family labour and 
less income to afford leisure.
14   
 
Surface Water 
Turning to the water input, the revenue elasticity with respect to surface water is 
increasing with farm size, although the estimates are significant only for small and 
medium sized farms. There is no out-of-pocket expense to the use of surface water, and 
farmers are endowed with a given number of canal turns per week, which depends on 
farm size. Therefore the positive and significant elasticities for small and medium size 
farms can be directly interpreted as reflecting the marginal value of relaxing the 
constraint to canal water use. This result supports the idea that larger farms face less 
constraint to water use; and it could be socially efficient to induce transactions that result 
in water transfers from larger farms to smaller. More developed water markets would 
facilitate such transactions. A working water market would also provide incentives for 
water saving measures and make more likely the private investments necessary to 
improve a deteriorating irrigation infrastructure, and water quality as previously reported 
in the literature [cf. Ali and Byerlee (2000) and World Bank (1997)]. 
 
Credit 
In Pakistan, previous authors have noted that small farmers have limited access to 
institutional credit, relying on non-institutional sources; larger operations are more 
favoured by formal credit lenders [Malik (2003)]. Farmers who are poorer and small rely 
primarily on informal credit markets. As shown in Table 7, the elasticity with respect to 
informal credit is insignificantly different from zero for the entire sample and negative 
(and statistically significant) for small farms.  The cost of credit is not explicitly 
accounted for in the net revenue measure, but to the extent that informal credit costs are 
reflected in purchased input costs, the low elasticity of informal credit to recipients 
implies less significant constraints to credit use. At the margin, farmers on average have 
adjusted informal credit use such that the addition to gross revenues from an increase in 
informal credit is offset by the addition to the costs of variable purchased inputs. 
Therefore, an increase in informal credit would produce little in terms of additional net 
revenues, and one would expect an elasticity of zero. In the case of small farmers, the 
negative and statistically significant elasticity may imply over-borrowing, with negative 
impacts on production value, which is difficult to justify. More likely, the result reflects 
reverse causality in the credit variable, where ceteris paribus less productive farmers 
have less access to formal credit and substitute for informal credit. The direction of 
causality may run from low production revenues to borrowing in informal markets.  
 
14The higher correlation of family size with agricultural labour of small farm households could be 
partially explained by lack of transport and communication facilities to find and travel to part-time jobs beyond 
their immediate vicinity.  Anríquez and Valdés 
 
298
In Table 8 we compare this base result using informal credit to estimates using 
both formal credit alone and the sum of formal and informal credit. One should note 
first that the estimated elasticities for the other inputs, using the alternative indicators 
of credit use, are not statistically different from the base case estimates, which 
indicates some overall robustness in the estimated elasticities. The elasticity with 
respect to formal credit is not statistically significant, but using the total credit 
available yields a positive and statistically significant elasticity (0.059). It is worth 
noting that formal credit is a larger source of funding of agricultural borrowing, as 
indicated in Table 1. The insignificance of the two estimated elasticities (for the 
entire sample) of both informal credit alone (negative) and formal credit alone 
(positive), and the positive and statistically significant estimate using the sum of two 
sources, suggests that the two credit types are substitutes.  
 
Table 8 
Return on Credit (Elasticities) 
 
Base Case 
Informal Credit  Formal Credit 
















































Note:  Standard errors in parenthesis. * Implies significant at the 10 percent level, ** implies significant at the 5 
percent level, and *** implies significance at the 1 percent level. 
          None of the elasticities are different from their base case values at the 10 percent significance level. 
 
We should emphasise, however, that these results reflect an average for farmers of 
all sizes, and smaller farmers receive a small share of formal credit. Small farmers 
apparently enjoy on average little gain to a marginal increase in informal credit, but 
informal credit is usually more expensive; so this evidence does not contradict the 
possibility that small farmers might benefit from greater access to formal credit, which is 
usually offered at lower interest rates. Khandker and Faruqee (2000) have shown that in 
spite of the fact that the recovery rate of loans is much higher for small farmers, the 
lending of the largest institutional lender, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 




Contrary to what was expected, there are few statistically significant interactions 
between output prices and factor returns. Perhaps the only strong interaction we find is 
between the relative prices of output and education. An increase in the prices of field 
crops and livestock, relative to the price of other crops, would increase the elasticity of 
net revenues with respect to education. A deeper interpretation of this result in a cross-
section analysis is problematic, because it depends on the mix of “other crops,” and 
also could be a result of the distribution of prices across regions. In any case, this is a 
noteworthy result deserving more attention in future research. We also find that the 
elasticity with respect to capital increases with the price of field crops and decreases 
with the price of other crops. To the extent that present policies offer protection to field 
crops relative to other crops, farmers have an increased incentive to invest, most likely 
in the protected activities. Field crops are usually more intensive in the use of physical 
capital. 
 
The Effects of Tenancy Type 
The coefficients on the dummy variables representing different tenancy types are 
all positive, implying greater revenues due to access to agricultural land compared to 
those without operational farmland (some landless). We find, that, controlling for farm 
size, education and the other variables, landlords who are also tenants leasing in, and 
fixed rental tenants earn more revenues than sharecropping tenants, who earn only 
slightly more (6,365 rupees) than those without operational farmland.
15 For a small 
farmer, controlling for all other variables in the revenue function, simply being a fixed-
rent tenant raises per-acre revenues by 35,000 rupees (75 percent of an average small 
farm’s total farm income, or 49 percent of the household’s total income). 
Does this imply that sharecropping is an inefficient contract compared to fixed 
rental?  Possible inefficiencies associated with sharecropping arise due to the sub-optimal 
provision of hidden or non-contractible inputs (not subject to monitoring by the 
landlord).
16 The incentive to under-provide variable inputs arises because the 
sharecropper only earns a fraction of the marginal value product of the operation. Where 
monitoring of input use by landowners is effective, one would not expect under-
provision. In our study possible “hidden” inputs (or hard to monitor) are own family 
labour (measured by family size) and surface water use. We find that this type of 
inefficiency exists in the provision of surface water as indicated by the positive 
coefficient on the interaction of sharecropper dummy with water. Since the marginal 
returns of canal water are greater for sharecropper tenants, this implies that there is an 
effective under-provision of this input. The marginal product of an additional unit of 
surface water is, ceteris paribus, greater for the sharecropper than for other tenancy types.  
 
15The marginal effect on revenues of being a sharecropper (relative to those without operational 
farmland) is a function of several coefficients, and is calculated using the average values of sharecroppers for 
household size, operational farm size and hours of water use: (299.6) + 8.51*(–27.77) + 2*(–31.73) + 56*(0.51) 
= 13.3 (with estimated coefficients in parenthesis). To get the value in Rupees we multiply by the mean price of 
“other crops” yielding 13.3* 480 = 6,365 Rp. 
16In a longer version of this paper, available from the authors, we provide a theoretical discussion of the 
efficiency of sharecropping contracts. Anríquez and Valdés 
 
300
In addition to this short-term inefficiency, there are also longer-term 
considerations. Land leasing arrangements as they prevail in Pakistan apparently do not 
provide land tenancy security or a mechanism to foment longer-term investments by the 
tenant. Such investments might be in soil-improvement, land leveling, fixed structures 
and orchards, and water-saving projects. All of these are projects that provide longer-term 
benefits but over which the tenant (sharecropper or fixed rent) has no ownership rights.  
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS 
Perhaps the most important result we found in this study is that land markets are 
not working efficiently in rural Pakistan. This result was consistently found not only in 
the regressions presented, but in all the statistical analysis that led to those results. Are 
our conclusions mis-guided by the fact that land decisions are endogenous? We do not 
believe so, because in the short term, land tenure (owned, rented or sharecropped) is 
fixed, i.e. for the agricultural season. Land holdings adjust in the medium term, while 
variable inputs (labour, fertiliser, capital equipment rental, etc.) are adjusted in the short 
term. Obviously, the fact that land resources may not be used to their full potential has 
enormous consequences for rural income, and thus for poverty in Pakistan. However, our 
results create a number of questions that we unfortunately cannot answer and should 
guide future research. Is there a problem of fragmentation between small land plots 
markets and large farms? Does land have important non-pecuniary value? Are there 
relevant search costs involved in the leasing process or is the threat of land reform/ 
expropriation blocking land transactions?  
In the case of surface water use, we found that medium and small farm show a 
higher productivity of water than large farms. This result is encouraging, because it 
provides empirical foundations for the proposition that creating a surface water market 
would improve farm revenues.  
A comparison of sharecroppers and other tenancy types yields interesting insights. 
Controlling for farm size, education and other variables, land owner-operators, landlords 
who are also tenants leasing in, and fixed rental tenants earn more revenues than 
sharecropping tenants, who in turn earn only slightly more than those without operational 
farmland.  Finally, with respect to efficiency losses of sharecropping contracts, we find 
that this hypothesis does not hold with respect to own (family) labour as is usually 
assumed, but applies to the use of surface water. Sharecroppers are slightly less efficient 
in the use of that resource compared to other tenancy-type farmers. Of course, other 
longer-term inefficiencies associated to sharecropping contracts, like the lack of 
incentives to implement resource (soil and water) enhancing investments are not captured 
in our short-run analysis.    
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